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financial reasons honorably to fulfill its obligation to the poor and which
concludes "This Act may be cited as the Poor Persons (Honesty) Bill, 1925."
It is to be hoped, indeed there is every reason to believe, that Justice and
the Poor in England will point the way and, by its revelation of the under-
lying causes, enable the English barristers and solicitors to erect a legal
aid system worthy of the highest traditions of the English common law.
And for their encouragement let us frankly admit that it is only within
very recent years and after the causes had been made plain that the
American bar bestirred itself to respond to Elihu Root's challenge in his
foreword to Justice and the Poor in the United States---"It is time to set
our own house in order."
REGINALD HEBER SMITH
Boston, Mass.
Cases on Equitable Relief Against Torts. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Cam-
bridge. Published by the Editor. 1924. pp. 522.
This collection of materials is edited "primarily for students who have
already mastered the main principles of Equity Jurisdiction and the
Specific Performance of Contracts." "It is entirely practicable, however,"
in the editor's opinion, "to use this book for the introductory study of
Equity if the more difficult cases be omitted."
The book is divided into six chapters and embraces some 500 pages. It
is designed for a course of some thirty lectures; but more material is inten-
tionally included than can be covered in such period. The volume will
properly mesh with the Harvard Law School curriculum. It is in sub-
stitution for Ames' cases on equitable relief against torts and comple-
mentary with Pound's Cases on Equitable Relief against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality. In structural arrangement and technique of
presentation of materials there is a nominal departure from Ames. In
types of cases presenting varied and more complex social, economic and
even political considerations, there is a substantial addition to and modern-
ization of Ames' materials. In the new volume also, there are almost no
cases reported from the none-too-intelligible literature of legal antiquity.
The presence of a decidedly liberal allowance of modern American materials
is also notable.
The first chapter-some 150 pages-is devoted to "The Growth and
Nature of the Jurisdiction over Particular Torts." Here is Chafee truly
Ames. The purpose of the chapter is to point out, concerning the various
torts, "that Chancery did not assume jurisdiction over them all simultan-
eously, and that each tort in the course of its development in Equity ex-
hibited certain specific peculiarities of treatment." To this end reported
cases and opinion-excerpts pass in review from earlier centuries down
approximately to date. There are "Waste", "Trespass", "Disturbance of
Easements", "Nuisance" and "Injuries to Business" to be so followed from
their legal antiquity to modern days. The "jump" from case to case may
be in terms of years or hundreds of years. Again, the "jump" may be
from the case of a nobleman pursuing his tenant who may be about to
prejudice his (the nobleman's) shade and shrubbery (1786), to a case con-
cerning the privileges of the lessee of commercial premises to make the
premises commercially fit (1878).
Assuming that it is important in a given case whether the rule of law
is one way rather than another, and assuming that the utility of rules of
law is determined by an evaluation of the social, economic and political
conditions of the times and place where, truly this chapter of cases rolls
up a voluminous hodgepodge of intricate problems concerning the Mo e's of
centuries long ago. If the author intends any such problem it seems almost
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too great to attempt. The author affords no references to sources of
materials which would be of assistance. But, grant a Utopian operation
of the particular rule on a yesterday at the place where, what of it? A
truism it is that "times change". Of course, it is also assumed by the
reviewer that it is scarcely useful to become religious over these "ancient
heads of equity" or their genealogy.
This is not necessarily intended as a *criticism of the author's accomplish-
ments in Chapter One. To the reviewer the material provides an excellent
teaching tool of legal methodology. It challenges the instructor's methods
of "solving" legal problems as well as affording opportunity to acquaint
the student with the problem of methods and results. To lead the student
to his own discovery that there is yet uncertainty and incompleteness in
the data concerning the "origins" of legal phenomena-let us say Waste or
Trespass, for example-lends aid to striking down any "budding" dogma-
tism or tendency to super-generalization and to inspire resort to scientific
method and possibly, even, further scientific research into the particular
problem at hand. An excursion into historical "origins" of legal institu-
tions may well be useful to develop scientific methods in beginning lawyers.
Again, as regards the "development" of let us say "Equitable Waste,"
Professor Chafee's materials may well be used to stimulate scientific
methodology in law study. To find varying assignments of reasons for
"Equitable Waste" in judges' opinions of the past 200 years may well be
used to provoke inquiry into the stimuli for such behavior and the validity of
the "theory." This will call for a choice of sources of data for such inquiry
and for the end in view. And again, of what significance are these general
statements (sometimes called "principles"), uttered by a judge in a ease
of a yesterday? To load rules of law with a social service for the era at
hand is sufficiently instructive on whence the pertinent data. A course
bringing out that legal evolution is not in vracuo, nor along metaphysical
"immutable principles" is invaluable. Instruction in a scientific method
that reaches out beyond the generalizations of judges into the present day
world of affairs, is likewise invaluable. A "solution" of cases "on principle"
yields to their pragmatic adjustment "on data." With these considerations
in mind the reviewer sees excellence in the romp through the historical
"origins" and "development" of the legal institutions treated.
Of the last section of the chapter-"Injuries to Business"--the reviewer
has doubts, however. These cases impress the reviewer as being primarily
problems in the substantive law of Trade Regulation. There seems to be
little question of "equitable" relief. The author's materials and the
arrangement thereof offer limited opportunity for any functional consider-
ation of Trade Regulation problems.
In presenting what the reviewer presumes to call the second section of
the author's book there is a departure, in form at least, from Ames. What
e xperience induced the change is not stated. Ames is substituted for "by a
different classification, in which each fundamental equitable problem, such
as . . . 'the balance of convenience' . . . [is] presented as a unit,
regardless of the kind of tort involved in the particular case which illus-
trates the problem." The cases are grouped by "general equitable
principles."
"Bases of Equitable Relief" is made the heading of Chapter II with sub-
divisions concerning "The Establishment of the Tort" and "The Inadequacy
of Other Remedies." Herein do we observe the courts, in the particular
case, putting cbntent into prevailing generalizations ("general principles")
-such generalizations as have heretofore been variously stated-see Hart
v. Leonard, page 150-and such more familiar formula as "inadequacy of
legal remedy" and "irreparable injury." How far the author's "establish-
ment" of "the tort" is intended to be in illustration of or a departure from
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Langdell's teachings concerning the impotence of equity is not quite clear
to the reviewer.
Material affording opportunity to examine various types of injunctional
orders, the problem of ordering "affirmative acts" as distinguished from
orders not to refrain from doing or not-doing, material illustrative of the
"flexibility" of injunctional orders issued and outstanding and the possibili-
ties of their ramifications are fully presented under "Relief in Equitable Pro-
ceedings Against Torts" in Chapter IV. Rules touching awards of dam-
ages in addition to or in substitution for specific relief are also covered in
this chapter-these problems being carried over into the Code states where
the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity "are abolished,"
but where questions of choice of actions and jury trial still come to the top.
Cases putting meaning into such formula as "balancing convenience,"
"discretion," "laches" and "clean hands" are brought in under "Defenses to
Specific Relief Although Other Remedies Are Inadequate" in the fourth
chapter. An editorial note on the "Effect of Legislative Changes in the Law
of Torts" paves the way for Truax v. Corrigan and the problems signallized
by that case.
In the final chapters consideration is had of the power of the official of
the political state to invoke equitable relief for "Protection of Public and
Social Interests," Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and In re Debs having
received text space. A survey of some problems of contempt and imprison-
ment therefor constitutes the problems of the last chapter---"The Enforce-
ment of Specific Relief."
The author is substantially indebted to Ames, as he acknowledges, for
text materials and materials used in annotating the text cases. The
author's original citations are extensive, however, and include a full citation,
of articles and notes from law school publications.
WESLEY A. STURGES
Yale University, School of Law.
Our Federal Republic. By Harry Pratt Judson. New York, The Mac-
Millan Co., 1925. pp. xii, 277.
This is an interesting and timely book. It represents the frank but
deliberately-formed views of the president emeritus of the University of
Chicago upon some of the most fundamental problems in our national
political life. It strongly argues that we have gone too far in giving to
the federal government centralized control over matters that were formerly
reserved to the states, that, in the interests of liberty, toleration, and a
proper development of local responsibility, this tendency should be checked,
and, if possible, reversed. One of the last paragraphs in the book reads:
"There should be a Twentieth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It
should simply repeal all amendments following the Fourteenth." (p. 267).
Nor are the views thus expressed merely the grumblings of a fearful or
discontented conservative, as our younger school of radicals delights to
picture them. President Judson's thesis is fairly presented and persua-
sively developed in an adequate setting of historical fact and political ex-
perience; and his conclusions, however debatable, cannot be dismissed to
the satisfaction of any thoughtful mind by the use of a few of the large,
vague adjectives, so common in the vocabulary of the New Republic.
The author first explains the basic idea of our government-which he
happily calls "the federal equilibrium"--that certain powers shall be ex-
ercised by the national government for all, certain others by the state
governments for their localities, and some are forbidden to the governments
of both the nation and the states, being reserved to the people of the United
States until such time (if ever) as, by constitutional amendment, their
